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Policy makers and environmental agencies have echoed concerns brought forward by academics about
the need to address the rebound effect for achieving absolute energy and environmental decoupling.
However, such concerns have generally not been translated into tangible policy action. The reasons
behind this inaction are not fully understood, and much remains unknown about the status of the re-
bound effect issue on the policy agenda and policy pathways available. Such knowledge gaps may
hamper the development of effective policies to address this issue. In this paper, we examine the extent
to and ways in which the rebound effect is considered in policy documents and analyse thirteen speciﬁc
policy pathways for rebound mitigation. The effectiveness of the pathways is scrutinised and conclusions
are offered to mitigate rebound effects. The main policy conclusions of the paper are that an appropriate
policy design and policy mix are key to avoiding undesired outcomes, such as the creation of additional
rebound effects and environmental trade-offs. From the discussion, economy-wide cap-and-trade sys-
tems as well as energy and carbon taxes, when designed appropriately, emerge as the most effective
policies in setting a ceiling for emissions and addressing energy use across the economy.
& 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Sustainable consumption policies worldwide are largely shaped
by the notion of resource and environmental efﬁciency, i.e., seek-
ing to reduce the amount of environmental pressures per unit of
product (e.g., Kilowatt-hour) or function/service (e.g., energy ser-
vices such as lighting) demanded. However, while energy and
resource efﬁciency has been continuously increasing through
history, largely due to technological innovation (Ayres and Warr,
2005; Smil, 2003), absolute environmental pressures for many
indicators have continued to rise (e.g., primary energy consump-
tion or raw material consumption) (Herring and Roy, 2007). Thisr Ltd. This is an open access articleparadox can be explained using the IPAT equation concept devised
by Ehrlich and Holdren (1971), which describes environmental
impacts (I) as a product of population growth (P), afﬂuence (A) and
technology (T). Thus, according to the IPAT equation, technological
improvements have not been able to offset pressures from in-
creases in population and consumption.1 In other words, while
there has been a substantial relative decoupling (a decrease in the
environmental impacts per unit of economic activity, observed
through the ‘technology’ factor), absolute decoupling (an absolute
decrease in environmental impacts, observed through the ‘impact’
factor) has not been achieved for most pressures. Moreover, anunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1 While the term ‘afﬂuence’, an indicator measuring economic activity as a
whole, is generally measured in the literature as gross domestic product per capita,
it is often assumed that it is consumption in a broader sense (economic activity
other than the design, production and marketing of goods and services) that drives
overall economic activity (Alcott, 2010).
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scribing a negative relationship between technology and con-
sumption in some cases; that is, the rationale that improvements
in technological efﬁciency (and, in a broader sense, efﬁciency
improvements in general (Gillingham et al., 2015; Schaefer and
Wickert, 2015)) have induced increases in consumption. This
mechanism is generally known as the rebound effect theory,
which has been deﬁned as the additional energy consumption
from overall changes in demand as a result of behavioural and
other systemic responses to energy efﬁciency improvements
(Binswanger, 2001; Brookes, 1990; Khazzoom, 1980; Saunders,
1992). An example of the rebound effect is the way in which fuel
efﬁciency improvements in passenger cars have made driving
cheaper, resulting in users driving more and buying bigger cars
(direct effect) and/or spending the remaining savings on other
products (indirect effect). As a result, total fuel and energy savings
are reduced. In the latter case, we speak of a backﬁre effect
(Saunders, 2000). When dealing with broader environmental as-
pects rather than energy use alone (as generally deﬁned by the
traditional energy economics literature), we speak of an environ-
mental rebound effect. This re-interpretation of the original en-
ergy rebound effect allows for broader assessments as well as
more comprehensive results in the context of environmental as-
sessment (Font Vivanco et al., 2014a).
The existence and relevance of the energy or environmental
rebound effect (hereafter referred to as the “rebound effect”) has
been acknowledged by many credible sources from both the aca-
demic and the public policy domains. Dozens of research studies
have identiﬁed and empirically analysed the rebound effect since
the early works of William Stanley Jevons (1865). Comprehensive
and updated summaries of such ﬁndings can be found in Sorrell
(2007), Jenkins et al. (2011). Likewise, various intergovernmental
organisations and international agencies have also echoed con-
cerns about the impact of the rebound effect on global sustain-
ability. Some examples of concerned entities include the United
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP, 2002), the International
Energy Agency (IEA, 2012), the European Commission (EC, 2012b)
and the European Environment Agency (EEA, 2013). These con-
cerns, however, have generally not been translated into any tan-
gible policy action (IRGC, 2013; Maxwell et al., 2011). The reasons
behind this inaction are not fully understood, and much remains
unknown about the status of the rebound effect issue on the policy
agenda as well as the range of policy pathways2 available. While
qualitative research has yielded reasonable explanatory causes
behind inaction (Levett, 2009; Nørgaard, 2008; Schaefer and
Wickert, 2015), a still unexplored explanation relates to the role of
the scientiﬁc community in shaping the policy agenda (Hempel,
1996). Regardless, the evidence currently available has spurred an
emerging discussion on how to address the rebound effect
through policy. Three policy strategies to mitigate the rebound
effect can be distinguished: (1) economy-wide increases in en-
vironmental efﬁciency, (2) shifts to greener consumption patterns
and (3) downsizing consumption (Girod et al., 2014). It is worth
noting that while these strategies are also valid for broader en-
vironmental policies, in this article, they will be discussed only in
the context of rebound mitigation. However, the complete range of
policy pathways and how they relate to these strategies is gen-
erally unknown. Such knowledge gaps may hamper the develop-
ment of effective policies to address the rebound effect.
This study aims to contribute to this growing ﬁeld of research
by addressing the following two general questions:2 By a policy pathway we mean the enforcement of any type of policy items
from the policy cycle (e.g., agenda setting, formulation, decision-making, im-
plementation and evaluation).1. What is the state of play of the rebound effect issue on the
policy agenda and what is the role of the scientiﬁc community?
2. What policy pathways are available and which of them could be
more effective to mitigate the undesired consequences of the
rebound effect?
The remainder of this article is organised as follows. Section 2
addresses the ﬁrst research question and investigates the reasons
behind policy inaction through a case study on the European
Union (EU). The second research question is addressed in Section
3, which presents a number of general strategies and speciﬁc
pathways for rebound mitigation and discusses their potential
effectiveness. Section 4 presents a general discussion on the suc-
cess of the European scientiﬁc community in introducing the re-
bound effect issue into the policy agenda and how to make re-
bound policies more effective. Section 5 concludes the article by
discussing the value, limitations and potential impact of the
ﬁndings.2. The rebound effect as a policy issue: the case of the Eur-
opean Union
In this section, we address the ﬁrst research question by
seeking insight into the current policy inaction to address the re-
bound effect issue, focusing on the impact of the scientiﬁc com-
munity. For this, we focus on the EU legislation as a case study.
While the EU states retain considerable legislative initiative on
energy and other environmental issues, the exploratory nature of
this study justiﬁes the decision not to broaden the scope of our
analysis. The objective of this exercise is to uncover to what extent
the rebound effect is considered in EU policies (as revealed
through policy document analysis), as well as to gain insight into
the role of the scientiﬁc community. It is not the aim of this paper
to systematically address the causes underlying policy inaction but
rather to complement and contextualise previous qualitative re-
search (Levett, 2009; Nørgaard, 2008; Schaefer and Wickert, 2015).
The methodology consists primarily of a keyword search of the
term ‘rebound effect’ through the EUR-Lex search engine (EC,
2014b) and a detailed analysis of the identiﬁed documents. Only
those documents in which the term is used in the context of en-
ergy/environmental assessment are included, thus excluding al-
ternative understandings (e.g., pharmacological). The EUR-Lex is
an ofﬁcial service that allows the consultation of the Ofﬁcial
Journal of the EU and provides the ability to search all types of
legal acts, including treaties, international agreements, legislation
and preparatory acts. Cross-citation analysis from the documents
identiﬁed through the previous approach has also been carried out
to survey other relevant documents in which the rebound effect is
not explicitly mentioned, but alternative labels such as the ‘take-
back effect’. Lastly, experts with a publication record on the topic
of rebound effect and policy analysis have been consulted to en-
sure that no relevant documents have been omitted in the pre-
vious analysis.
As of the writing of this study, a total of 35 legal acts ac-
knowledge the existence of the rebound effect. From this survey,
we observe that the rebound effect has increasingly found its way
into the EU policy documents over almost two decades. The ﬁrst
mention of the rebound effect in a legal act appears in the year
1996 in a communication from the former Commission of the
European Communities (CEC) entitled ‘The information society:
From Corfu to Dublin. The new emerging priorities’ (CEC, 1996). In
this communication, the CEC voiced concerns over the creation of
additional demand for material consumption as a consequence of
developments in information and communication technology
(ICT). The issue was then ignored for a decade until it was brought
02
4
6
8
10
12
14
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
N
um
be
r o
f d
oc
um
en
ts
DG TREN
DG ENV
DG ENER
DG ENTR
DG TAXUD
DG CLIMA
Legal acts
Comissioned studies
Fig. 1. Number of European Union legal acts and cooperative research studies commissioned by the European Commission in which the rebound effect is mentioned. Source:
European Commission (2014b).
3 In line with the general literature, this study focuses on the environmental
consequences of the rebound effect. It is important to note, however, that rebound
effects also have economic and social implications, and that in some contexts they
can be seen as a way to manage social issues, such as energy poverty (Ürge-Vorsatz
and Tirado Herrero, 2012). It is also important to note that ‘positive’ or ‘conserva-
tion’ rebound effects are also possible (Saunders, 2005), that is, cases in which the
rebound effect actually leads to a net decrease in energy use and other environ-
mental pressures.
4 As explained in footnote 1, consumption can be understood as the main
driver behind overall economic activity, and consumption-oriented policies can
therefore be seen as more effective in addressing rebound effects.
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companying an impact assessment report for the Action Plan for
Energy Efﬁciency 2006 (CEC, 2006). From then on, the rebound
effect has been increasingly mentioned in various legal acts (see
Appendix A for a complete list), mainly in working documents and
opinions. The rebound effect is also mentioned (albeit brieﬂy) in
the report ‘Global Europe 2050′ by the European Commission (EC,
2012b). Only 6 legal acts can be considered to recommend some
form of policy action to mitigate the rebound effect. For instance,
the EC (2011b) suggested in a working document to manage de-
mand by implementing appropriate measures in several policy
areas to take full advantage of resource efﬁciency improvements.
Also, another working document from the EC (2014a) outlined the
need for a close monitoring of possible rebound effects and ade-
quate action to address them. Finally, the EC (2009, 2012a) sug-
gested economic mechanisms such as energy taxation to coun-
teract the rebound effect. No binding act (regulation, directive or
decision), however, explicitly mentions to the rebound effect and
thus no corrective policy action has yet enforced.
While the rebound effect issue seems to be on the European
policy agenda, how has it been introduced is still largely unknown.
A plausible hypothesis is that the issue was actively promoted by
the scientiﬁc community, as has happened with many other en-
vironmental issues (Hempel, 1996). In the European context, one
of the most important channels between science and policy are
cooperative research projects commissioned by the EC, the out-
comes of which generally convey policy recommendations. To test
whether such research projects have been used as a platform to
introduce the issue into the policy agenda, we have analysed the
correlation between legal acts and commissioned research studies
that both mention the rebound effect (see Fig. 1; for a complete
list, see Appendix A). The correlation is found to be positive and
striking. To further analyse the causality, we have investigated
whether the calls for tenders of the commissioned studies ex-
plicitly requested to address the rebound effect. We have found no
reference to the rebound effect in those calls that are publicly
available, which leads us to believe that the outcomes of these
studies in terms of recommendations regarding the rebound effect
somehow induced policy responses, and not the other way around.
Policy recommendations have mainly targeted the Directorates
Climate Action (DG CLIMA) and Taxation and Customs Union (DG
TAXUD), with 14 studies (64% of the total) and 3 studies (14% of
the total), respectively. It can be thus interpreted that these
agencies are considered by the scientiﬁc community to be the
most suitable to forward policy recommendations on the rebound
effect issue.The peak in 2011, with 12 legal acts and 5 studies, has been
partly attributed to the impact of ‘The Rebound Effect Report’ by
the UK Energy Research Centre (Sorrell, 2007), which spurred
debate among academics, the media and policymakers (US, 2014).
Also released in 2011 was the report of the project ‘Addressing the
rebound effect’ (Maxwell et al., 2011), commissioned by DG En-
vironment, which, summarises potential policy measures to ad-
dress the rebound effect based on the outcomes of previous stu-
dies. This project can be interpreted as a turning point regarding
the introduction of the rebound effect issue in the European policy
agenda, serving as a reference for a number of posterior legal acts.
From the year 2011 onwards, a sharp decrease in the presence of
the issue in both legal acts and commissioned studies can be ob-
served. The reasons for this decline are unclear.3. Policy pathways for rebound mitigation
This section addresses the second research question posed in
the introductory section by mapping the policy options available
to address with the rebound effect and reﬂecting on their potential
effectiveness. Section 3.1 exposes general strategies to mitigate
detrimental rebound effects,3 and Section 3.2 expands on this by
describing how these strategies can be operationalised through
speciﬁc policy pathways.
3.1. General strategies for rebound mitigation
The causes behind macro-level environmental pressures can be
grouped under three general explanatory effects: technology,
structure and demand effects (Leontief, 1970). Strategies to miti-
gate environmental issues can thus be classiﬁed according to the
speciﬁc effect they aim to improve. Following this classiﬁcation,
and in the context of consumption-oriented rebound effects,4 the
available rebound mitigation strategies can be described as:
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sectors, (2) shifts to greener consumption patterns and (3) down-
sizing consumption (Jackson, 2014). In simple terms, these can be
referred to as ‘consuming more efﬁciently’, ‘consuming differently’
and ‘consuming less’, respectively (Sorrell, 2010). Below, we de-
velop such strategies and their relevance in the context of rebound
mitigation.
The strategy ‘consuming more efﬁciently’ aims at reducing the
overall magnitude of positive rebound effects by improving, for
instance, via technology, the environmental intensity (environ-
mental pressures per monetary unit5) of consumption as a whole.
An example would be the introduction of an energy efﬁciency
improvement, for instance, a new transport fuel, which would
lower the embodied energy intensity of all sectors. In such a case,
the rebound effects stemming from other sectors (e.g., heating)
would have a lower magnitude because the impact intensity of the
liberated income will decrease and thus have a lower capacity to
offset environmental gains. Being an efﬁciency-oriented measure,
however, one potential issue is the creation of additional rebound
effects through additional demand. The effectiveness of this
strategy would thus largely rely on whether overall environmental
gains are obtained, or in other words, on whether additional re-
bound effects are relatively smaller than the ones that are
mitigated.
The strategy ‘consuming differently’ also targets decreasing the
magnitude of rebound effects, but by inducing changes in con-
sumption patterns towards products with less environmental in-
tensity (e.g., electricity obtained solely from renewable energies).
By doing so, the indirect rebound effect from other technological
changes is expected to decrease. Another advantage is that it can
induce changes in the consumption determinants (e.g., income) in
a way that can minimise or even reverse the own rebound effect
(negative rebound effect). For instance, the cost of electricity is
likely to increase when it shifts to renewable sources, thus binding
income and consumption. A shortcoming of this strategy, however,
is that because environmental efﬁciency is not improved through
innovation, rebound mitigation is limited by the current technol-
ogy stock and the possibility of shifting between consumption
products. An additional potential downside of this strategy is that
reductions in the demand for products associated with high re-
bound effects do not necessarily lead to an overall decrease in
environmental pressures, as economic savings can be allocated to
other consumption with similar or even higher environmental
intensities.
The strategy ‘consuming less’ aims at downsizing individual
consumption. In the context of rebound mitigation, it seeks to
avoid or minimise rebound effects by means of non-consumption,
that is, by avoiding rebound effects from consuming new, im-
proved products or minimising indirect rebound effects by self-
limiting one's purchasing power (e.g., by reducing working hours).
It can be achieved by either voluntary means (voluntary frugal
behaviour, see Section 3.1) or involuntary means (e.g., command-
and-control or economic instruments) resulting in an effective
reduction of the purchasing power. While this strategy offers a
simple and effective way to reduce rebound effects, a number of
issues must be considered. For example, this strategy is not im-
mune to new rebound effects (Alcott, 2008), and, regardless of
whether it is voluntary or not, seems to be a strategy better suited
for the wealthy, as only they have sufﬁcient ﬁnancial security to
renounce their non-essential welfare.5 While we focus on price rebound effects, the same concept also applies to
non-economic rebound effects (e.g. time or space).3.2. Policy pathways for rebound mitigation
Published studies regarding policy pathways for rebound mi-
tigation have been scarce to date, and efforts have generally fo-
cused on market-based instruments, mainly carbon and energy
pricing (Saunders, 2011). Some authors, however, have identiﬁed a
number of potential policy pathways, including non-market in-
struments. For instance, van den Bergh (2011) identiﬁes ﬁve policy
pathways for rebound mitigation in the context of energy con-
servation: (1) information provision and “moral suasion”, (2) com-
mand-and-control, (3) price regulation, (4) subsidies and (5) trad-
able permits. Santarius (2012) describes four pathways: efﬁciency
standards, ecotaxes, absolute caps and sustainability communica-
tion. Lastly, Maxwell et al. (2011) deﬁne six pathways: (1) design,
evaluation and performance of policy instruments, (2) sustainable
lifestyles and consumer behaviour, (3) awareness raising and
education in business, (4) technology and innovation, (5) eco-
nomic instruments and (6) new business models. The latter can be
considered the most comprehensive study in terms of mapping
and discussing policy alternatives for rebound mitigation known
to date. Other relevant studies include the works of Sorrell (2007),
the International Risk Governance Council (IRGC, 2013); Azevedo
(2014), Ouyang et al. (2010), Levett (2009), Herring (2011), Freire-
González and Puig Ventosa (2015).
While highly insightful, previous studies present scope for
improvement as some potential policy pathways and relevant
discussions were not approached. In this section, we attempt to
complement the existing knowledge base in this regard. Moreover,
we aim to establish the relationship between such pathways and
the proposed general strategies described in the previous section.
By doing so, we intend to gain insights into the effectiveness of
policy pathways by analysing aspects such as potential synergies
and trade-offs. Such an approach is framed within the second re-
search question posed in the introductory section, which ad-
dresses the possible policy pathways for rebound mitigation and
their potential effectiveness. Using a variant of the classiﬁcation
developed by Maxwell et al. (2011), we identify a number of policy
pathways and classify them according to the type of instrument
and the strategy that is ultimately targeted (see Table 1).
In the following sections, each pathway will be further ex-
plained and discussed drawing from practical cases and simula-
tions from the literature. Each pathway is presented using the
following structure: ﬁrst, a general overview of the pathway, in-
cluding a brief justiﬁcation of why it is useful for rebound miti-
gation and a description with the help of practical cases; second, a
discussion of the pathway's potential to effectively reduce rebound
effects, including potential disadvantages, such as the creation of
additional rebound effects, and, if possible, ways to overcome
them.
3.3. Policy design
3.3.1. Recognition in policy design
The rebound effect issue has always been the object of aca-
demic debate, with multiple deﬁnitions and analytical approaches
available (Sorrell, 2007). This has led to “very sparse empirical
evidence that is currently sustaining the strong dispute over the
importance of the rebound effects”, which has often been “trans-
lated into the exclusion of the rebound effect matter in ofﬁcial
policy analysis” (Mudgal et al., 2008: 144). Moreover, as introduced
in Section 2, these uncertainties have been used by policymakers
as a rationale to support inaction (CSES, 2012; EC, 2011a). Al-
though this rationale seems widespread in the European context,
some national governmental bodies have included rebound effect
estimates in policy strategies and targets. After reviewing various
empirical studies and consulting stakeholders (Maxwell et al.,
Table 1
Policy pathways for rebound mitigation according to the type of instrument and
general strategy.
Type of policy
pathway
Rebound mitigation strategy
Increased en-
vironmental efﬁ-
ciency – “con-
suming more
efﬁciently”
Consumption
shifting – “con-
suming
differently”
Downsize con-
sumption –
“consuming
less”
Policy design Recognition in
policy design
Broader deﬁnitions and toolkit
Benchmarking tools
Sustainable con-
sumption and
behaviour
Consumption
information
Identity
signalling
Standardisation
Autonomous
frugal behaviour
Innovation Targeted eco-
innovation
Environmental
economic
policy
Energy/carbon tax
Bonus-malus schemes
Cap and trade schemes
Rebates and subsidies
New business
models
Product service
systems
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mate Change decided to take into account the direct rebound ef-
fect when estimating the potential energy savings from domestic
insulation and other measures. Concretely, such energy savings are
reduced by 15% to account for the “comfort taking” effect (that is,
the increase in internal temperature as a response to energy efﬁ-
ciency improvements). Another example is the Ireland's “National
Energy Efﬁciency Action Plan 2014″ (DCENR, 2014), which assumes
a high rebound effect of 70% associated with the “comfort taking”
effect in low-income households when calculating the outcomes
of energy saving measures. Outside Europe, the U.S. Department of
Energy includes a 10% rebound effect from car standards into its
energy forecasting according to the IRGC (2013).
By acknowledging the energy and broader environmental sav-
ings that are lost due to the rebound effect, its recognition can aid
in achieving environmental goals from policy measures, either by
allocating extra resources or by fostering different technologies
with lower associated rebounds (e.g., technologies with smaller
changes in their total cost of ownership [TCO]). Empirical evidence
supporting the effectiveness of this pathway, however, is not
currently available. The potential disadvantages of this pathway
include the expenditure of additional public resources dedicated
to the calculation of rebound effects and the achievement of more
ambitious objectives.
3.3.2. Broader deﬁnitions and toolkit
The rebound effect debate has often focused on its very deﬁ-
nition, for instance, regarding the type of technical changes that
can cause the effect (e.g., energy efﬁciency alone or wider en-
vironmental efﬁciency changes) or the consumption determinants
leading to it (e.g. only economic factors related to prices andincome or broader factors, such as time costs) (Font Vivanco and
van der Voet, 2014). By deﬁning the rebound effect in a way that
broader effects can be included, for example through the ‘en-
vironmental rebound effect’ concept (Font Vivanco et al., 2014a),
trade-offs can be considered in the policy design and additional
resources can be allocated to mitigate unwanted effects. Moreover,
the academic literature offers a panoply of methods to estimate
the rebound effect, some being relatively complex and opaque, as
is often the case with macroeconomic models (Sorrell, 2007). This
makes communication and public engagement challenging and
could deter policymakers from addressing the rebound effect.
There is thus a need for relatively simple, transparent and ready-
to-use tools to estimate rebound effects from policies. One ex-
ample of such a tool is that developed by the UK Department of
Energy and Climate Change (2014), which estimates the direct
rebound effect or “comfort taking” effect from relevant energy-
saving policies in its policy evaluation. This is done through a
publicly available spreadsheet that allows users to enter estimates
of direct rebound effects for different commodities such as elec-
tricity, gas and road transport and for domestic, commercial and
industrial uses, either in absolute or relative terms. However, we
have found no evidence of other similar tools to calculate other
indirect or macro-economic effects.
There is currently no evidence supporting the effectiveness and
feasibility of this pathway in terms of rebound mitigation. Some
disadvantages may relate to the acceptance of broader deﬁnitions
of the rebound effect considering current uncertainties and debate
in both the scholarly and policy spheres, as well as the risk of
overlooking complex macroeconomic rebound effects by devel-
oping tools that only capture narrow microeconomic effects.
3.3.3. Benchmarking tools
Rebound effect models sometimes require large amounts of
data, e.g., data on environmental proﬁles or economic costs, to
calculate magnitude estimates. Modelling exercises can thus be-
come quite resource intensive. Given that any technological
change or innovation can potentially lead to rebound effects, one
challenge is to identify which of those innovations can lead to the
most detrimental rebound effects (or the most favourable negative
rebound effects) without having to compile all of the necessary
data to run a model. One way to screen multiple innovations and
benchmark them according to their relevance is to identify which
parameters most inﬂuence the magnitude estimates and gather
data only for those. This approach has been developed by Font
Vivanco et al. (2015) in the form of an “enhancement/offsetting
potential indicator” that places innovations in a two-dimensional
indicator based on: (1) the change in available income from the
use of an innovation and (2) the difference between the environ-
mental intensity of the innovation and that of general consump-
tion. By applying such a benchmarking tool, innovations that re-
quire policy attention can be identiﬁed more easily.
Again, due to the lack of experience in the use of such tools,
there is currently no empirical evidence supporting their effec-
tiveness in reducing rebound effects. Some disadvantages of this
type of tool relate to the use of resources to gather all necessary
data and the risk of overlooking additional key variables.
3.4. Sustainable consumption and behaviour
3.4.1. Consumption information
Modern literature from the social sciences considers the social
and cultural dimension of consumption (Jackson, 2005), in con-
trasti with the traditional economic theories of consumer beha-
viour, which attributed exclusive explanatory power to income
levels and prices (Brekke and McNeill, 2003). From this perspec-
tive, the existence of socio-psychological costs has been theorised,
D. Font Vivanco et al. / Energy Policy 94 (2016) 114–125 119that is, the theory that any consumption entails non-economic
costs to consumers (the value of a consumption factor other than
money [e.g., time and information]) that are culturally and socially
deﬁned, including environmental values and attitudes (de Haan
et al., 2005; Hofstetter et al., 2006; Jackson, 2005). In the context
of rebound mitigation, an action with high potential to increase
environmental awareness is to confront consumers with their in-
dividual consumption levels, such as through smart meters6 and
enhanced billing with additional information on consumption. The
objective of this action is to reduce the direct rebound effect from
efﬁciency improvements, especially for those products with high
environmental intensity, such as heating, with the goal of allo-
cating more resources to less environmentally harmful products
through re-spending.
Smart meters and enhanced billing are found to reduce non-
essential energy and water consumption in households. Con-
cretely, Darby (2006) describes energy savings of approximately 5–
15% due to the use of smart meters and up to 10% via enhanced
billing, and Wright et al. (2000) reports energy savings of up to
10% due to enhanced billing. Further, according to House (2010),
smart water meters would have decreased water consumption an
average of 17%. As stated in Section 3.1, however, economic savings
can be allocated to other consumption with similar or even higher
environmental intensities (e.g., air travel), thus only partially de-
creasing the associated rebound effects. Therefore, it is important
to raise awareness in both households and businesses so that re-
ductions in consumption for the improved products (direct effect)
are not invested in environmentally intensive consumption cate-
gories (Maxwell et al., 2011; Nørgaard, 2008; Druckman et al.,
2011). There is also a need to counteract adverts that perhaps
unknowingly aggravate rebound effects. Relevant examples are
Tesco's campaign “Turn lights into ﬂights” (Gillespie, 2009b) or Air
miles’ “Mobile recycling that gives you Airmiles” campaign (Gille-
spie, 2009a). A similar case is that of a power utility that en-
couraged customers to use the energy savings from low energy
lamps to increase lighting consumption (Nørgaard, 2000). Policies
aimed at correcting perverse green advertising are thus needed in
combination with consumption information actions to achieve the
desired environmental savings.
3.4.2. Identity signalling
Following modern theories of consumer behaviour, evidence
shows that consumption does not only exclusively aim at fulﬁlling
functional needs, but also at reinforcing conceptions of identity
(Brekke and McNeill, 2003; Hurth, 2010). Products thus become a
symbol through which to communicate or signal individual values
to others (Levy, 1959). To function as a symbol, however, a product,
or more precisely, the act of consuming it, must be visible to others
(Sirgy, 1982). Visibility becomes thus crucial to determine the ef-
fect of identity signalling on product choices (Belz and Peattie,
2009). For people with an environmentalist identity (Hurth, 2010),
signalling pro-environment values can be an effective way to
promote the consumption of products associated with lower re-
bound effects.
There is evidence of the effectiveness of measures related to
identity signalling. For example, Griskevicius et al. (2010) studied
consumer choices for green products under various visibility
constraints, concluding that a product's visibility is positively
correlated with the chances of consumers switching to green
products. For instance, participants were more likely to purchase a
green product while shopping in a mall than when shopping6 Smart meters refer to consumption recording devices that enable two-way
communication with the user or utility company and offer real time feedback on
consumption.online. One way to promote shifts towards more sustainable
consumption may therefore be to increase the visibility of green
products. This becomes especially crucial for those products whose
purchase or consumption is barely observable, such as electricity.
In this sense, Hanimann (2013) studied whether the presence of a
visible symbol would inﬂuence consumers to choose renewable
energy services instead of conventional electricity. The author
concluded that a welcome gift with various visible elements
(sticker, doorplate, email signature and a magnet) would increase
demand for renewable electricity by 10–14% with respect to a
control group. A key disadvantage of identity signalling measures
are the high use of resources involved in consumer awareness
campaigns, such as personnel and materials, as well as the need to
coordinate the measures with the appropriate industrial sectors.
3.4.3. Standardisation
Standardisation has proven to be a successful tool in shaping
behaviour towards more sustainable consumption patterns in
several cases and can therefore be used to mitigate the size of
direct rebound effects from efﬁciency-oriented innovations.
Among the various types of standards, we focus on two in the
context of rebound mitigation: technical standards and labelling
standards. Technical standards lay down uniform engineering or
technical criteria, methods, processes and practices, whereas la-
belling standards pertain to uniform labelling systems for con-
sumer products. To be more effective, standardisation should be
prioritised in those product categories with high environmental
intensities, such as heating or transport, to offset the direct re-
bound effect.
Some relevant examples of technical standards in the context
of energy use are those for the energy transmittance of glass in
buildings (EN 410 and ISO 9050) or the thermal performance of
solar collectors (ISO 9459); however, many options for technical
standardisation still remain unexplored. For instance, Biermayr
and Schrieﬂ (2005) propose creating a standard for central heating
systems so that they automatically turn down at night and reg-
ulate the indoor temperature according to the exterior tempera-
ture. The aim is to limit the amount of energy used to achieve
similar levels of comfort. For transport, European emission stan-
dards have already been introduced (Kågeson, 2005), and future
transport-related standards may relate to intelligent transport
systems (ITS) (Williams, 2008), for instance, to public transport
planning. Such standards could have an effect on reducing car
travel.
Regarding labelling standards, according to Ecolabel Index
(2014), there are at least 458 environment-related labelling stan-
dards (broadly referred as ecolabels) in the world and 235 in
Europe. Some examples of widespread ecolabels in Europe are the
EU ecolabel, the EMAS and the EU Energy Label. Ecolabels, how-
ever, are rarely based on life cycle data (only 23 in the world),
which describes all of the upstream and downstream environ-
mental impacts from products. These type of labels, also known as
“footprint labels” (Weidema et al., 2008), can help consumers shift
to more sustainable products on a life cycle basis. In the context of
rebound mitigation, footprint labels can reduce the so-called life-
cycle or embodied rebound effects (Sorrell, 2009), which are re-
lated to the upstream and downstream processes involved in the
additional consumption.
Technical standards have often proven to be effective in shifting
towards sustainable consumption patterns. For instance, in the
context of transport, the European emission standards have pro-
ven to be successful in inducing technology change to limit auto-
mobile exhaust emissions (Kågeson, 2005). Regarding footprint
labels, in a study on the effectiveness of carbon labelling of food,
Gadema and Oglethorpe (2011) found a stated preference rate of
72% from supermarket shoppers for carbon labels. Ozkan (2011)
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tion of milk, ﬁnding that approximately 32% of the sample stated a
preference to pay up to 5% for the milk they typically purchase if a
label showed notable carbon reductions. The same study also
found that approximately 21% of organic milk consumers would
switch to conventional milk if a label showed that the latter en-
tailed carbon reductions of more than 5%. A potential downside of
technical standards is the decrease in economic competitiveness
from key industrial sectors by forcing technical change. For la-
belling standards, a key issue could be the transmission of a clear
message to consumers, or as noted by Gadema and Oglethorpe
(2011), confusion in interpreting and understanding labels, which
can signiﬁcantly hinder their effectiveness.
3.4.4. Autonomous frugal behaviour
Autonomous frugal behaviour is based on the principle of suf-
ﬁciency, which relies upon the notions of restraint and moderation
of individual consumption (Princen, 2005). Sufﬁciency behaviour
is based on two concepts: (1) it presupposes purchasing power, so
that essential consumption (e.g., food or heating) is still possible
after downsizing consumption and (2) it is driven by environ-
mental motivation (Alcott, 2008). Sufﬁciency can be achieved by
reducing one's purchasing power, for instance, by means of
working or earning less (ibid). Such measures, often proposed
within the ‘degrowth’ movement (Martínez-Alier et al., 2010), can
notably reduce rebound effects by limiting one's real income and
thus the impact of re-spending effects.
The effectiveness of sufﬁciency measures in terms of reducing
environmental burdens from consumption, as well as of social
beneﬁts, has been demonstrated in the context of the reduction of
working hours in developed countries (Hayden and Shandra,
2009; Knight et al., 2013; Rosnick and Weisbrot, 2007). While
being a simple and effective way to mitigate the rebound effect,
one of the principal barriers to the adoption of sufﬁciency-based
strategies is its social acceptance, mainly because of the “con-
sumption lock-in” phenomenon and various consumption habits
that are difﬁcult to overcome (Sorrell, 2010). To increase its social
acceptance, it will likely require “collectively agreed objectives,
priorities, procedures and constraints that are institutionalised
through government action” (Sorrell, 2010: 1794). Additionally,
these strategies are not immune to new rebound effects, as the
decrease in demand for some products can lower their price and
induce extra demand (Alcott, 2008).
3.5. Technological innovation
3.5.1. Targeted eco-innovation
The existence of the rebound effect should not hinder tech-
nological development aimed at increasing the environmental
efﬁciency of products (eco-innovation), but rather shed light on
which innovation areas have greater potential to achieve absolute
decoupling. Existing evidence on the drivers of the rebound effect
can help to determine which aspects are most important to
prioritise between innovation areas. For instance, as Sorrell (2007),
Herring and Sorrell (2009) note, the rebound effect tends to be
larger for general purpose technologies, such as fuels, as they have
strong complementarities with existing and new technologies and
are transversally applied, leading to economy-wide rebound ef-
fects. Additionally, innovations that entail large cost savings7 are
also prone to larger rebound effects. For instance, Font Vivanco
et al. (2014b) found that the notable cost reductions from diesel
engines were an important explanatory factor of a backﬁre effect.7 In the context of a broadly deﬁned rebound effect, not only cost savings, but
also any reduction in the consumption factors (e.g., time or space) would apply.In this sense, policies should focus on fostering innovations that
entail moderate cost reductions or even cost increases to avoid
large rebound effects. It bears noting that cost increases are not
necessarily associated with decreases in utility, as higher quality
products can be consumed, e.g., more durable products or mobility
products, such as public transportation, that allow consumers to
increase their comfort or save time (e.g., by means of tele
working).
Evidence shows that targeted eco-innovation can effectively
reduce the occurrence and size of rebound effects. Font Vivanco
et al. (2015) analysed seven alleged eco-innovations in the context
of passenger transport, from which only three would result in net
environmental gains in terms of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions
due to the impact of re-spending effects. Thus, by analysing po-
tential rebound effects, a selective promotion of effective eco-in-
novation is possible. This pathway, however, does not tackle sys-
temic issues leading to rebound effects, such as market prices and
consumer behaviour, and is thus limited by the existing technol-
ogy stock.
3.6. Environmental economic policy instruments
3.6.1. Environmental taxation
When applied appropriately, pricing mechanisms,have proven
to be a successful way to push consumers’ and businesses’ beha-
viour towards more sustainable practices (Sterner, 2003). In the
context of the rebound effect, many authors claim that appropriate
taxes could mitigate its magnitude, with energy and carbon taxes
being the most popular formulations (Saunders, 2011). Two types
of taxation approaches can be identiﬁed in the rebound literature:
a product or sector-speciﬁc tax and a transversal tax across eco-
nomic sectors. The ﬁrst aims primarily at mitigating the direct
effect from speciﬁc products or sectors, whereas the second aims
at curbing both direct and indirect effects by means of general
improvements in the environmental intensity of the economy as a
whole.
Few studies have analysed the effects of environmental taxes
from the point of view of rebound mitigation. Kratena et al. (2010)
applied a micro-econometric approach to calculate the tax levels
necessary to offset a combination of the direct and indirect effects
from Austrian households for fuel (gasoline and diesel), heating
and electricity. The tax levels required were found to be 7%, 80%
and 60% of the pre-tax price, respectively. Further macroeconomic
effects, however, were not studied. Saunders (2011) used a macro-
econometric approach to estimate the sector-speciﬁc energy tax
levels necessary to offset historic direct rebound effects in the U.S.
economy. The study found differing tax levels between economic
sectors, ranging from approximately 10% to more than 300%. The
study concluded that a uniform tax would have differing success
among sectors with respect to rebound mitigation. Additionally,
the results of a uniform tax would result in a decrease of ap-
proximately 5% in economic output, unemployment and proﬁts.
The results from Saunders (2011) show the detrimental con-
sequences of a uniform tax on the economy, leading the author to
suggest the use of sector-speciﬁc tax levels. Such individual taxes
would minimise the decreases in total output, unemployment and
proﬁts, although they raise a number of practical issues (Maxwell
et al., 2011). The author further suggests that these negative effects
could also be mitigated by “using the tax proceeds to reduce em-
ployers’ payroll taxes, thus reducing their labor costs” (Saunders,
2011: 10), similarly to the Climate Change Levy adopted in the UK88 The Climate Change Levy is an energy tax imposed on most energy users
except domestic users, charities and low energy-intensive commercial users. The
rates are applied on the basis of the consumption of electricity, gas and solid fuels.
The revenue is used to fund various energy efﬁciency investments as well as to
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pact of this redistributing scheme in the same case study, con-
cluding that the economic costs of a uniform GHG tax on the
macroeconomic indicators studied would have not only been ef-
fectively undone, but improved. Other authors suggest that the re-
investment of the tax proceeds should, in any case, avoid inducing
economic growth, and propose additional options such as public
investment in clean energy sources that help to achieve absolute
decoupling or other natural capital enhancements (Druckman
et al., 2011; Jenkins et al., 2011; Maxwell et al., 2011). The existing
evidence, though scarce, suggests that a sector-speciﬁc environ-
mental tax could be an optimal economic solution to mitigate the
rebound effect, although how the tax proceeds are invested seems
to be a crucial factor. Moreover, Sorrell (2007) argues that carbon/
energy pricing must be calculated endogenously according to re-
levant variables (e.g., behavioural and market aspects), so that it
increases progressively to accommodate new rebound effects.
3.6.2. Bonus-malus schemes
Bonus-malus schemes, also known as feebates or hypothecated
taxes, are a variant of environmental taxes in which the tax pro-
ceeds are used to incentivise more sustainable choices, for in-
stance, through subsidies. They have been proposed as a more
ﬂexible instrument for rebound mitigation than taxes owing to the
possibility of both incentives and disincentives (Maxwell et al.,
2011). Some examples of bonus-malus schemes can be found in
the purchase of new appliances and cars.
The success of bonus-malus schemes appears limited. At ﬁrst
sight, a scheme applied to the purchase of new cars in France,
through which buyers of CO2 intensive cars were charged a tax
whose proceeds are invested in subsidies for less carbon intensive
cars, appeared environmentally beneﬁcial in in terms of the CO2
emissions per km of new vehicles (D’Haultfœuille et al., 2014). By
performing a decomposition analysis based on empirical data,
however, D’Haultfœuille et al. (2014) concluded that the scheme
did not achieve the desired goal by leading to an overall increase
in absolute CO2 emissions, mainly due to the increase in the ﬂeet
size and the direct rebound effect. The authors also argued that the
‘pivot point’ dividing penalties from incentives and the magnitude
of the rebates were inappropriately set and that a re-adjustment
could lead to overall decreases in CO2 emissions. Bonus-malus
schemes can thus increase the efﬁcacy of taxes but also add an
extra layer of complexity in their design.
3.6.3. Cap and trade schemes
Cap and trade schemes share certain traits with environmental
taxes. Under similar circumstances, the main difference is that
while taxes set a price for a given product and the market de-
termines the quantity of the associated environmental pressures,
cap and trade schemes set a ceiling on a given pressure. The
market then sets the price for the pressure and ultimately the
products (Durning, 2009). Although similar in theory, a panoply of
practical issues can make any one instrument more feasible than
another (Hovi and Holtsmark, 2006). Cap and trade schemes are
more attractive than taxes because they focus on the desired end
(e.g., a decrease in absolute environmental pressures), rather than
potentially problematic means (e.g., increased environmental ef-
ﬁciency) (Alcott, 2010; van den Bergh, 2011). In the context of
rebound mitigation, cap and trade schemes are sometimes
claimed to be “immune to rebound effects”, as should “a rebound
effect occur within one sector, the sector in question would have to
buy allowances on the market, thus contributing to reductions(footnote continued)
reduce the employer's rate in the National Insurance by 0.3%.elsewhere” (EC, 2014a: 29).
Cap and trade schemes have proven to be a cost-effective op-
tion to limit GHG emissions; one example is the EU Emissions
Trading System (EU ETS) (Ellerman and Buchner, 2007). Some
authors, however, reﬂect on the risk that the EU ETS and other
schemes would discourage efﬁciency improvements and in some
cases actually induce increases in overall energy and GHG emis-
sions because allowances remain constant irrespective of the
overall efﬁciency of the affected system (Chitnis et al., 2013; Sorrell
and Sijm, 2003). Thus, if a participant implemented an efﬁciency
improvement, allowances would free up and be available for other
participants in the scheme. The limited scope of this scheme has
also been subject to discussion. For instance, some authors pro-
pose its extension to road transportation, which is currently not
included (Flachsland et al., 2011). Such an extension could be a
technically feasible and effective way to reduce economy-wide
GHG emissions (EC, 2014a). Regarding the statement that these
schemes are immune to rebound effects, this would hold true only
if (1) the cap and trade scheme encompasses all of the economic
sectors, (2) only direct emissions are considered and (3) other
environmental pressures are disregarded. Otherwise, the rebound
effect could appear in other economic sectors through indirect
effects, in upstream processes of the supply chain (e.g., situated in
other countries) or through other environmental pressures.
Therefore, the design of the cap and trade scheme will largely
determine whether rebound effects would in fact be completely
offset. Moreover, their impact on other indicators, such as the total
output or employment, remains largely unknown (Jorgenson,
1984; Sorrell and Dimitropoulos, 2007).
3.6.4. Rebates and subsidies
Environmental rebates and subsidies incentivise changes in
consumption by rewarding consumers choosing environmentally
friendly products. These rewards can be in the form of refunds or
reductions in the effective price of products (e.g., via purchasing
cost). Some examples in the European context are energy efﬁ-
ciency rebates (Speck, 2008) or subsidises for the purchase costs of
electric cars (Kley et al., 2012). Rebates and subsidies present the
advantage of being generally more socially accepted than other
“command and control” instruments such as taxes or cap and trade
schemes (Nilsson et al., 2004).
The effectiveness of these instruments in the context of re-
bound effect mitigation is largely unknown. While they have been
praised for reducing relative environmental pressures in some
cases (Andersen and Sprenger, 2000), they also have been criti-
cised for sometimes failing to address absolute decoupling, for
instance, by inducing rebound effects, including the stimulation of
economic growth (Chandra et al., 2010; Kampman et al., 2011). In
this sense, some aspects need to be considered in their design.
First, direct rebound effects can be minimised by conditioning the
rebate magnitude to the use of the product. For example, the re-
bate for energy-efﬁcient products can be determined according to
the quantity of energy consumed (Irrek et al., 2010). Second, re-
bates can reduce the TCO of more efﬁcient products, leading to
both direct and indirect rebound effects. Moreover, because con-
sumers have a subjective perception of costs and beneﬁts, the
concept of economic reward may change the equilibrium point
between alternatives (Kampman et al., 2011). Rebates and sub-
sidies can thus be a socially accepted way to induce changes in
consumption, but the potential for creating new rebound effects
via re-spending is high unless, for instance, the revenues for such
programmes come from the taxation of environmental harmful
activities. In contrast to environmental taxes, the responsibility for
how the additional expenditure is spent lands with the consumers,
which may not prioritise the reduction of rebound effects or en-
vironmental pressures in general. Therefore, the overall beneﬁt
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smaller than the decrease in magnitude of the existing ones.
3.7. New business models
3.7.1. Product service systems
Product service systems (PSS) have been deﬁned as “a mar-
ketable set of products and services capable of jointly fulﬁlling a
user’s needs” (Goedkoop et al., 1999: 18), and PSS-oriented busi-
ness models have been proposed as an alternative to achieve the
material and energy decoupling of the economy (Goedkoop et al.,
1999). Some relevant examples are car sharing schemes or laundry
services, among many others (Mont, 2004). In the context of re-
bound effects, PSS have the potential to reduce indirect effects by
enabling consumers to meet their needs using less resource in-
tensive options (Maxwell et al., 2011).
The environmental performance of PSS in the context of re-
bound effects has been not explored. Being a generally efﬁciency-
oriented measure, however, warnings about induced rebound ef-
fects have been raised (Manzini and Vezzoli, 2003). For instance,
outsourcing can lead to careless behaviours (Manzini and Vezzoli,
2003), and economic savings can lead to direct and indirect re-
bound effects. Font Vivanco et al. (2015) studied the direct and
indirect rebound effects in terms of global warming (GW) emis-
sions (in CO2 eq.) from car sharing schemes in Europe for the
period from 2000 to 2010. The results showed a combined re-
bound effect of 135%, meaning that all GW emissions savings were
offset and emissions even increased (backﬁre effect). The authors
explained the notable rebound magnitude mainly as a result of
large decreases in the TCO and differences between the GW in-
tensity (emissions per €) of CSS with respect to that of general
consumption, which drove up the indirect rebound effect. Heis-
kanen and Jalas (2003); Suh (2006) also concluded that the en-
vironmental beneﬁts of a shift towards a service-based economy
are modest to none. The application and diffusion of PSS has also
proven to a challenge, partly because of the difﬁculties in changing
routinised behaviour (Tischner et al., 2010). According to one es-
timate, approximately 80% of daily consumption choices stems
from routinised behaviour (Tischner, 2012). This challenge must be
considered and addressed in policy design. In any case, similarly to
previous instruments, PSS will be successful in mitigating the re-
bound effect inasmuch as signiﬁcant new rebounds are not in-
duced as a result of increases in the environmental efﬁciency of
providing services. To achieve absolute decoupling, PSS can be
combined with other tools, such as those based on consumer be-
haviour (see Section 3.2) or economic instruments (see Section
3.4).4. Discussion
This section presents a general discussion of the research
questions posed in the introductory section by analysing the in-
sights gained in Sections 2 and 3. Section 4.1 reﬂects on the suc-
cess of the scientiﬁc community in inﬂuencing the policy agenda,
while Section 4.2 discusses ways to make rebound mitigation
policies more effective.
4.1. The unsuccessful push from the scientiﬁc community to in-
troduce the rebound effect issue into the policy agenda
The scientiﬁc community has been successful in raising atten-
tion about the rebound effect in science and in policy circles, but
unsuccessful in inducing policy makers to introduce measures to
contain and prevent rebound effects. Rebound effects are not
considered in most environmental appraisals for policy and onlyoccasionally in energy-environment-economy models. Notwith-
standing a decade of warnings, research projects’ calls for tender
rarely prompt the study of the rebound effect, limiting the policy
activity to opinions and working documents that merely react to
such warnings and rarely urge any tangible policy action. The re-
bound effect issue is thus far from being a consolidated, priority
issue on the European policy agenda, and no legally binding legal
act on the matter has yet been enforced. Although we have no
knowledge of similar exercises in other geographical scopes, a
simple search shows that this inaction may be generalised. For
instance, the search for the term “rebound effect” in the United
States Code of the U.S. House of Representatives (2014), the con-
solidated database of general and permanent laws of the United
States (US), yields no results. Similarly, the same search in the
Australian Government's “ComLaw” database (2014), a compre-
hensive collection of Commonwealth legislation, also yields no
results.
The reasons for such inaction are likely to be manifold and of a
diverse nature and scope. Ongoing academic debates about the
deﬁnition and uncertainties of rebound estimates related to the
complexity of the modelling approaches are often referred to in
legal acts as reasons for inaction (CSES, 2012; EC, 2011a). However,
the experience of national governments, for instance the UK, Ire-
land and the US (see Section 3.1), show that it is possible to ac-
tively address the rebound effect through policy under such cir-
cumstances. The ulterior motives may therefore be different, for
instance, the difﬁculty of combining policies aimed at constraining
demand with the current widespread GDP-based economic
growth paradigm (Sorrell, 2010). Indeed, the predominant efﬁ-
ciency-oriented policies (those aimed at improving environmental
burdens per economic output without questioning the latter)
seem to offer an apparent win-win situation for governments. On
the one hand, they generally offer relative decoupling of various
environmental pressures, which is credited as proof of a successful
environmental policy (e.g., decrease in passenger cars’ GHG
emissions per km). On the other hand, they incentivise economic
activity via increased demand (rebound effect) and technological
innovation, which increases social welfare and drives up the GDP.
Furthermore, the endorsement of efﬁciency by policymakers, in
contrast to sufﬁciency strategies such as taxes, entails low levels of
political risk because it does not challenge the existing status quo
(Princen, 2005).
The bias towards efﬁciency-based policies can also be ex-
plained because they are better aligned with prevailing discourses
of managerial and business efﬁciency (Levett, 2009; Schaefer and
Wickert, 2015). This could explain, for instance, why the terms
“energy conservation” and “energy savings” were progressively
replaced by “energy efﬁciency”, because “this was more acceptable
to conventional economics and established interests” (Nørgaard,
2008: 211). In this sense, Schaefer and Wickert (2015: 34) argue
that efﬁciency has become “an unquestioned end in itself that
organisations and managers relentlessly pursue, without realizing
potentially counterfactual effects”, leading to an “efﬁciencysm”
doctrine. The authors also describe two enabling conditions of this
doctrine: (1) “interpretive ﬂexibility”, or the social construction of
efﬁciency potentials, leading to the erosion of established meaning
structures and the reduction of reﬂexivity, among others; (2) and
the “maximisation imperative” or the view of efﬁciency as a le-
gitimate organisational goal (Roberts and Greenwood, 1997). Le-
vett (2009) also suggests several other reasons why policy-makers
struggle to deal with the rebound effect, such as the unpredict-
ability of policy actions and the difﬁculty of obtaining evidence of
their success in the context of complex and adaptive systems.
Overcoming the current systems-myopia would thus entail chan-
ging the foundations of the prevailing rational approach to public
policy.
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This paper identiﬁes a number of policy pathways available to
address the rebound effect and which offer governments multiple
alternatives. By analysing the advantages and disadvantages of
each action, it becomes clear that there is no single optimal in-
strument and that appropriate design and policy mixes are key. An
important aspect of the policy design is to take into account ad-
ditional rebound effects and consider ways to mitigate such ef-
fects. Another important aspect is the formulation of the policy, as
empirical evidence and simulations show. For instance, the success
of a carbon tax in curbing emissions depends largely on how the
proceeds are spent. Moreover, cap and trade schemes may simply
shift environmental pressures if their scope is insufﬁcient, or may
disincentivise efﬁciency improvements if the level of allowances
disregard efﬁciency changes in the affected system. It is also im-
portant to consider socioeconomic factors to avoid essential wel-
fare losses through regressive policies, for example, by reducing
employment or bounding income from low income groups (Chit-
nis et al., 2014). For instance, rebound effects can be seen under
certain circumstances as a way to mitigate social issues such as
energy poverty (Ürge-Vorsatz and Tirado Herrero, 2012). An op-
timal conﬁguration, however, often relies on a knowledge base
that is currently limited, as empirical evidence or evaluation stu-
dies on the actual effects of policy mixes are missing, which shows
the need for further research and implementation.
Adequate combinations of policy pathways are crucial for an
effective rebound policy. By classifying pathways according to
three essentially different strategies, synergies can be better
identiﬁed. It is recognised to a degree that sustainable consump-
tion strategies adddressing the efﬁciency, structure and overall
levels of consumption are needed in combination (Jackson, 2014).
Thus, ideal combinations should attempt to use all available stra-
tegies to avoid trade-offs and maximise their effectiveness. The
potential combinations are manifold, and in the following we
describe a number of possible options. One possibility is the
combination of economic instruments such as taxes with targeted
technology eco-innovation to mitigate the magnitude of economic
rebound effects from cost differences. Additionally, the use of
consumer behaviour actions such as consumption information and
standardisation to shift consumption patterns, may strengthen the
effects of carbon taxes. Another example would be the introduc-
tion of more encompassing deﬁnitions for the rebound effect so
that economic instruments, such as cap-and-trade schemes, do not
result in shifting environmental burdens. Whereas all policies have
a role to play, economic instruments, such as carbon taxes and
cap-and-trade systems, have the greatest potential to reduce re-
bound effects and avoid burden shifting. They promote technolo-
gical change as well as changes in demand, thus avoiding tradeoffs
that are associated with efﬁciency gains.5. Conclusions and policy implications
Empirical evidence prompts policy makers to address the re-
bound effect if their intentions to achieve absolute energy and
broader environmental decoupling are genuine. Policy responses
so far, however, have been scarce and too little ambitious, al-
though a panoply of policy pathways and combinations of these
are available. The ongoing academic debate on the uncertainties
behind rebound estimates has sometimes been used to justify
inaction, but more complex reasons may underlie such positions.
Some important reasons are the inability to reconcile policies
aimed at constraining demand with the existing GDP-based eco-
nomic growth paradigm, the better alignment of efﬁciency stra-
tegies with prevailing managerial discourses and the lack of asystems perspective in policy that would allow policy makers to
better predict and verify the success of a rebound mitigation
policy. Meaningful rebound mitigation and environmental strate-
gies in general may thus require a shift towards systems-literate
policy action (Levett, 2009) as well as transformative changes in
the current socio-economic structures (Sorrell, 2010).
The analysis has identiﬁed a number of practical experiences
for rebound mitigation through policy, mostly from Europe and
other developed countries. As van den Bergh (2011) notes, how-
ever, rebound mitigation policies are particularly relevant in de-
veloping countries, for instance, because of the relative high costs
of energy or the lack of saturation of consumption levels. Ad-
ditionally, developing countries likely have a higher potential to
introduce transformative changes due to the still developing or
unstable socio-economic structures (Ayres and Simonis, 1994). For
this reason, rebound mitigation strategies are likely to be more
effective in these countries than in developed countries. However,
aligning rebound mitigation policies in developing countries with
the need to increase social welfare levels might be a challenge.
These observations must be considered carefully in the context of
global sustainability challenges and the increasing trend of in-
dustrial relocation to developing countries.
Lastly, most policy instruments are designed to tackle single
environmental vectors, the most common being energy and GHG
emissions (e.g., energy taxes and GHG cap and trade schemes). The
rebound effect, however, ultimately relates changes in technical
efﬁciency with changes in demand, with energy and GHG emis-
sions being one environmental outcome of many possible out-
comes. Thus, within the framework of the environmental rebound
effect, that is, a change in demand that can be expressed through
multiple environmental indicators, it is important to consider
trade-offs between environmental pressures. Narrow deﬁnitions
of the rebound effect can lead to a ‘whack-a-mole’-type of game
when addressing speciﬁc environmental issues through policy.Acknowledgments
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